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INFINITY IN A GRAIN OF SAND: 
THE WORLD OF LAW AND LAWYERING 
AS PORTR.A YED IN THE CLINICAL 
TEACHING IIVIPLICIT IN THE 
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUlVi 
Howard Lesnick* 
I. THE SETTING 
I believe that law teachers systematically portray the world of 
law and lawyering to students in ways that, to a great extent, distort 
their own beliefs. This Essay explores that perceived dissonance, 
and describes one attempt to resolve it. 
* Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. A.B. 195 2, New York University; A.M. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Columbia 
University. 
My thoughts and understanding have benefited enormously from my association 
over six fruitful years with many faculty and student colleagues at the City University of 
New York Law School at Queens College. Of special salience was my intensive work 
with Professors John Farago, Jack Himmelstein, and Vanessa Merton (now Associate 
Dean and Director of Clinical Programs at Pace University School of Law) during the 
initial planning year ( 1982-83). I long ago lost the capacity to discern the boundaries 
between what I brought to our common enterprise and what I learned from them. 
I am grateful, too, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow and the participants in the UCLA­
Warwick Second International Conference on Clinical Legal Education, for their sup­
port and ideas, and to Jack Himmelstein and my University of Pennsylvania colleagues 
George Haskins, Stephen Morse, and Michael Schill for helpful responses to a draft of 
this essay. 
I owe the title (but not, I hasten to confess, the subtitle) also to John Farago, and 
through him to William Blake, whose words deserve to be rendered unmodified: 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour. 
W. BLAKE, Auguries of Innocence, in WILLIAM BLAKE: POETRY AND DESIGNS 209 
(M. Jo.hnson & J. Grant eds. 1979). 
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My initial premise is that all law teaching is clinical teaching. 
By that, I mean that much of what we teach is taught implicitly, 
and even a course with an explicit agenda that is oriented to a field 
of substantive law inevitably will contain many implicit messages 
about what it means to be a lawyer.1 The dichotomy between 
teaching about law and teaching about lawyering is porous, first, 
because the lawsuits that are the vehicle for studying substantive 
law contain many messages about lawyering and� second, because 
one's premises about law itself, even if implicit in the study of a 
legal subject, have powerful implications for the lawyer's role as 
well. The law of professional responsibility, for example, is to a 
significant degree shaped by conceptions of lawyering that have 
their ideological anchor in the underlying premises of contract law. 
The study of contracts, although ordinarily not addressing that con­
nection explicitly, predisposes students to view the lawyer's work in 
ways that are consistent with the premises of contract law. 
To some significant extent, the premise that in teaching law we 
also teach lawyering is today not controversial, condemned perhaps 
more as banal than as mistaken. I have in mind, however, more 
than the familiar litany of themes captured by the notion of "think­
ing like a lawyer:" awareness of, and the ability to use, the ambigu­
ity of language, the elusiveness of facts, the subjectivity and 
ambivalent guidance of values, and the centrality of procedure and 
of the concepts of institutional competence and role. My conten­
tion is that what we are (predictably) taken to say about being a 
lawyer is far less measured and qualified than what we may mean to 
say. Intention is not the end of the matter, and the actual content of 
our teaching, I will suggest, goes a significant way beyond what 
many teachers would (rather proudly) acknowledge. 
Several aspects of the educational experience, of which individ­
ual teachers tend to take insufficient account, affect the reach of that 
implicit teaching. The first is the differing way teachers and stu­
dents apprehend legal education. Teachers tend to think of the stu­
dent's experience, and the goals and methods of law school, as a 
three-year enterprise. Conscious as we must be of the ungraspable 
reach of the learning agenda, we tend to seek balance-within and 
among history, doctrine, theory, professional identity, and skill-
1. The reference in the subtitle to the "clinical teaching" in a traditional curricu­
lum is not therefore to the ''clinics" and similar lawyering-focused programs now a 
fairly common portion of the traditional curriculum. I write here almost entirely of the 
"classroom," law-focused courses that make up virtually all of the early, and the bulk of 
the later, experience that students have of law school. 
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over the entire curriculum. Specifically, we tend to think of the first 
vear more as a foundation for what is to follow than as a summary 
immersion in the whole. This tendency is a natural one, for we re­
side in the experience over time, as a faculty viewing it as a whole 
and as individuals teaching in various aspects of it from year to 
year. 
The experience of students is quite different. Their immersion 
is both fuller and narrower, far more intensive and far less exten­
sive. The intensity is at its height in the first year� particularly in 
the first semester; it is total (or near-total) for that one cycle, with 
no opportunity to revisit the earlier experience in the light of the 
latter. I believe that it is what is imprinted in that initial immersion, 
and not any broader message of the three years, that shapes stu­
dents' consciousness of what is important and not important to be­
ing a lawyer. Any significant shift in the portrayal of law and 
lawyering in subsequent courses does not alter students' "map" of 
the legal world.2 Rather, students judge that shift in light of what 
has gone before. What does not fit into the imprinted pattern stu­
dents tend to cabin off and treat as peripheral, exceptional, or 
questionable. 
If this perception is correct, we must say what we mean to say 
early on, as a full portion of the students' initial immersion in law 
study, for students will hear subsequent corrections, completions, 
and elaborations in ways that do not essentially alter the framework 
initially set forth, and will take supplementation of the initial 
message as more a comment on the supplementer than a modifica­
tion of the message. 
Moreover, the perceived content of an individual teacher's as­
sertions is affected by the ubiquity of that message in the whole of a 
student's law school experience. For a teacher to emphasize only 
some aspects of the complex totality of a lawyer's function may not 
be in itself a serious distortion, but if each of a student's teachers 
makes a similar selection of attributes, the overall message will 
surely be that the omitted qualities are of no great importance. In 
short, a selectivity justified as a mere division of labor or function 
can operate as such only if what teachers omit in one part they 
supply in another. Yet that is seldom the case, especially in the 
crucial first year; in most students' experience, their teachers es­
pouse roughly the same catalogue of lawyerly virtues. 
2. The term is Leonard Riskin's. See Riskin, Jlfediation and Lawyers, 43 OHio 
ST. L.J. 29, 43-46 (1982). 
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Finally, the implicit quality of the assertions augments their 
power: by not putting a question on the table for examination, while 
acting on the basis of an answer to it, a teacher in effect tells his or 
her students that acceptance of the answer is part of a proper defin.i­
tion of a lawyer. Controversy over the acceptability of the answer 
presumably is to be resolved prior to the decision to sign on to the 
law school enterprise; dissenters made (or were) an admissions 
error. 
II. THE IMPLICIT CURRICULUM 
My hypothesis is that we can discern in legal education the 
assertion of a number of significant truths about lawyering and law; 
that much of the content of these assertions is not congruent with 
what many law teachers would avow; and that where the assertions 
are explicit or would be avowed, they are typically asserted as axi­
oms, as "givens," rather than as the subject of exploration and 
choice. I cannot proffer a complete set of such assertions, and I 
recognize that there are discernible differences among teachers and 
schools. Nonetheless, I believe that a recognizable implicit curricu­
lum is for the most part alive and well in the experience of the great 
majority of law students. 3 
To make this hypothesis more concrete, I examine three "case 
studies." They exemplify much, although certainly not all, of what 
I will catalogue as the content of the messages about being a lawyer 
that I see implicitly espoused in the law school curriculum. Recog­
nizing that anecdotes can illustrate, but not document, a thesis, I 
3. I will focus only on the implicit messages of the explicit curriculum, that is, of 
the content of the courses. The idea of an implicit curriculum-the idea that much of 
what we teach about being a lawyer we transmit by the attitudes and practices that we 
model-goes much further, however, and applies to such areas of law school life as the 
admissions and placement processes, relaiions of faculty and students with the nonpro­
fessional staff, and the bases on which we choose people to speak at school functions, 
receive awards, judge moot court, or have their pictures hung on our walls. It means 
little, for example, to talk about respect and concern for the disadvantaged as a social 
value if at the same time we reinforce by our conduct the widespread tendency to give 
people our attention, and our honors, on the basis of prestige, titles, and authority. 
Consider the criticisms of so mainstream a figure as former N.Y.U. Law School Dean 
and New York City Bar Association President Robert McKay: 
Law schools measure their success in terms of the positions taken by their 
graduates-the larger the law firm, the more prestigious the practice; the 
higher the court for which a clerkship is secured, the more likely is the 
candidate to move on to successful corporate practice. There is nothing 
wrong with these goals; it is simply that one wonders if that is all there is 
to the profession. 
McKav. Bevond Professional Res{Jonsibilitv, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 709, 710 (1981). 
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invite the reader to consider whether that content resonates with his 
or her own sense of what is true.4 
A. Three Case Studies 
Since we cannot all have shared a single classroom experience, 
I will look to the closest thing to it. I want too to make it clear that 
I am not speaking of "Kingsfieldism" or any supposed abuses of the 
system, but of what is mainstream, high-quality, core. On both ac­
counts, I cannot begin in a better way than by looking to the 
lfarvard Law Review. I will examine the discussion of the Supreme 
Court's decision in lVLRB v. Yeshiva University 5 in the Supreme 
Court Note of November 1980.6 
1. A Harvard Law Review Note 
The thesis of the Note is that the case was wrongly decided. In 
Yeshiva, the Supreme Court held that university professors at some 
universities are managerial employees excluded, albeit implicitly, 
from the protection of the National Labor Relations Act.7 Essen­
tially, the Note asserts that the Court made a mistake in harmoniz­
ing the legislative decisions to protect the self- organizational rights 
of professional, but not those of managerial, employees. The con­
cluding sentence fully sums up the whole burden of the essay: "The 
Court should have adopted the analysis of the dissent. "8 All the 
Note says explicitly is that the case was wrongly decided. However, 
the implicit assertions are much broader and more fundamental.9 
4. In a luminous essay, White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 
TENN. L. REV. 161 (1987), James Boyd White described the approach to which I am 
drawn: 
I invite the reader to check what I say against what he or she knows .. . .  
Rather than making a case that is meant to stand or fall by the degree to 
which the unwilling are compelled to assent to it . . .  I mean to present a 
set of reflections ... to be tested against the reader's own. 
!d. at 167. I believe that such an approach more fully enables fundamental questions to 
be opened up, rather than shut off, and is a necessary supplement to the prevailing 
approach, which not only values logical inference and empirical inquiry, but tends to 
view them as the exclusive bases of persuasiveness and academic respectability. 
5. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
6. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 251-61 (1980). 
7. YeshiYa, 444 U.S. 672. 
8. Note, supra note 6, at 26 1 .  
9. I have chosen this Note in part because I agree with the position it takes. I 
regard the Yeshiva University decision as a dreadful example of conservative judicial 
activism. I can therefore use the Note as an example of something that concerns me 
without triggering the response that I am simply unhappy with the students' preferred 
result. 
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The Note asserts, first, that law, or at least adjudication, is a 
rational affair, a process of reasoning-that it is largely a technical 
matter: the legislature makes value judgments in enacting a statute, 
and the Court uses techniques or doctrines of institutional compe­
tence to decide cases under it.10 The principles of statutory con­
struction are one example; the principles of judicial review are 
another. The Note asserts that the Court erred in the purpose it 
attributed to the legislative action of including professionals and ex­
cluding managers. 
Second, the Note says implicitly that to exercise one's critical 
judgment about a legal question (and of course that is what it is 
doing-these are not simply hacks telling you what the law is) 
means to engage in evaluation rather than explanation or under­
standing. The Note contains nothing to help anyone understand 
how it was that the Supreme Court made this mistake. One might 
speculate, but there is not a word that would explain the result. 
The real issues that would shape one's reaction to the underlying 
problem that gave rise to the litigation are never even set out, much 
less analyzed. It is not self-evident what the "real" issues are, but to 
me they have to do with one's view of the relationship between 
union and member, and between employer and employee, in partic­
ular, professional employee. That question is not connected to the 
explanation of the decision at all. 
The implicit quality of the preceding statements gives them 
much unspoken content about the job of being a lawyer. First, we 
are all pretty much doing the same job. The judges, majority and 
dissent, the Harvard Law Review editors, the Harvard Law School 
labor law teachers, you and I, and perhaps even counsel (albeit 
counsel is committed to a result) are all engaged in bringing our 
intellectual powers to bear on reasoning a problem through to a 
solution. 
10. Legal education in many ways has long contained the implicit assertion that 
adjudication is by far the largest part of law, and nearly the only part worth thinking 
about. The Harvard Law Review has no annual "Congress Note." As Michael Fitts has 
observed: 
For most of our history, the legislative process ... has not been the focus 
of sustained legal scholarship .... 
When the legal profession did scrutinize the internal mechanisms of 
the legislative process ... [it] often viewed them somewhat in the manner 
of a common law judge reviewing the opinions in prior cases-rationalis­
tic and public-regarding. 
Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the 
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L REV. 1564, 1569-71 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
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I am not asserting that the preceding statements are incorrect, 
but that their accuracy is likely to be partial and in any event is not 
self-evident or axiomatic . Further, they are far more central to our 
thinking about law and learning law than questions that have to do 
with the harmonization of the managerial-professional dichotomy 
under the NLRA. To the extent that we do not make the correct­
ness of those statements the explicit agenda, we are making the fur­
ther assertion that a good lawyer does not question the view that 
law is rational, that the legislature makes the critical value judg­
ments, that interpretation is a technical problem, and that the essen­
tial problem of criticism is to evaluate rather than to understand or 
explain. 
The Yeshiva case-both the dispute out of which the litigation 
arose and the Supreme Court's treatment of the legal question­
bristles with values conflicts regarding collective bargaining and 
unionization, the relation between employees and the union to 
which they belong, authority in the workplace, and the duty of loy­
alty assertedly owed to one's employer. By excluding all such ques­
tions from discussion, the Note silently (that is, loudly) asserts that 
our values, emotions, and concerns in these areas have nothing to 
do with our work as lawyers. Indeed, the implicit message is that 
such concerns too easily get in the way of good lawyering� and that 
the task of legal training is to facilitate the compartmentalization 
and repression of concerns over such matters in favor of what might 
be termed a "moot court" view of lawyering. Like the judges, the 
lawyers are all simply doing technical work, and a "good" legal job 
implicates such major matters as one's tangible conditions of em­
ployment and such minor matters as the length of one's commute to 
and from home. It is a simple further step to the presumption that 
the distribution or availability of legal services surely cannot be a 
serious problem, for it is almost a random event that a lawyer hap­
pens to represent one cause rather than another, one adversary 
rather than another. 
I can view the implicit messages of the Yeshiva Note as broadly 
as I do only if I am correct in viewing it as neither simply an in­
stance of flawed law review writing nor as atypical in its approach, 
only if one can find similar analyses of legal questions in the daily 
experience of law students affecting the treatment of upper-level, 
regulatory or lawyering courses as well as the classic first-year or 
"private lavv" core curriculum. I therefore turn to examine two ad­
ditional case studies, one in the area of professional responsibility, a 
field presumably committed to examining issues of lawyers' roles, 
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and the other a problem in adminstrative law, a course that presum­
ably complements any perceived narrowness in the first-year experi­
ence. I believe Ihat each illustrates powerfully how difficult it is to 
leaven the implicit messages of law school. 
2. A Forum on Professional Responsibility 
Judge John Ferren, formerly a leading corporate and public­
interest lawyer, presented a hypothetical problem to a forum on 
professional responsibility problems of the corporate lawyer. 1 1  
Briefly, the situation is this: you are outside counsel to an aircraft 
manufacturer, Trireme Aluminum Company. The chief engineer of 
the company-someone you have known as a friend over the 
years-tells you in confidence that he is very disturbed about the 
safety of a new alloy being used in a new plane. The alloy passed all 
safety tests, but the engineer fears the tests do not sufficiently screen 
for the unusually high altitude, and accompanying extreme cold 
and extreme low pressure, that will characterize the plane in use. 
He tells you that some of his staff share his fears and some do not, 
and concludes: "Whatever you do, don't use my name." 
The problem postulates that you go to the company president, 
whom you know fairly well, and ask (in a way that does not identify 
the engineer as your source) whether there is a problem with the 
new alloy. The president rather shortly says that a couple of people 
in the engineering department were worried, but that he looked into 
it and learned that most of the engineers say it is perfectly all right. 
(The president's statement is in fact true.) You are hesitant to drop 
the point, but the president gets very upset when you persist. We 
can imagine that his response proceeds something like this: "Look, 
this development has turned us around; we were a failing company, 
as you well know, and now we are marketing this plane. It is a fine 
plane, there's no problem, and starting rumors will destroy the 
company; we will all be out on the street, and the whole city will 
hate us, if we recall this plane. So just forget it." He is quite upset. 
The problem first asks whether you may, or must, bring this 
issue to the board of directors. Next, the problem hypothesizes that 
you do raise the issue at the board level. The president states that 
he has looked into this question, that a couple of people think there 
may be a safety problem but most do not, and that he thinks there is 
no problem. The chairman of the board thanks you for your inter-
11. See Ferren, The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation io the Public Interest, 33 Bus. 
LAW. 1253, 1253-54 (1978). 
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est, notes that lawyers traditionally are worriers, and says that while 
it is useful to have people play that role, Harry over here is the 
president because we trust him, and we can regard the matter as 
now closed. He turns to the next agendum. 
Of course, the next thing that happens is that a plane crashes, 
killing a number of people. The Federal Aviation Adminstration 
issues a directive, which, in effect, grounds the new plane pending 
an investigation, and serves the company with a subpoena demand­
ing production of certain records. The company asks you to stop 
the investigation. You can file a motion asserting that, under the 
applicable substantive law, there is an inadequate basis for the di­
rective and asking to have it stayed. You can file a second motion 
asserting that unless there is a valid pending proceeding the sub­
poena has no legal basis, and seeking to quash the subpoena unless 
and until the court rules against Trireme on your first motion. The 
result of success in this double-barrelled attack would be to get the 
planes flying again, while hindering an investigation of the cause of 
the cr�sh. 
The problem goes on to analyze your obligations. I am not 
interested in the substance of the issue, but in the way the presenta­
tion considers it. The questions discussed are these: (1) is with­
drawal as counsel at any one of the steps described permissible 
under DR 2-llO(C) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil­
ity?; 12 (2) if you do withdraw, may you (in light of applicable Bar 
Association opinions) tell your successor-to whom the chief engi­
neer would certainly not say anything-what you know?; and (3) 
what are your obligations under DR 7-102 vis-a-vis the investiga­
tion that is going on on behalf of the public? DR 7-102(B)(l) pro­
vides that, if a lawyer learns that it has been clearly established that 
a client has perpetrated a fraud on a person or tribunal, disclosure is 
compulsory unless the information was privileged.13 The presenta­
tion discusses whether fraud has been established, and whether 
clearly so or not, and then whether a person or tribunal has been 
the victim: does "a person" mean an individual, or may it extend to 
society at large? Is an agency a "tribunal" when it is acting in an 
investigative rather than an adjudicative capacity, or may it now be 
12. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C) (1980) 
(enumerating situations in which an attorney is permitted to withdraw). The problem 
was pubiished prior to the appearance of the Model Rules on the scene. See MoDEL 
RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c) (1983) (permissive withdrawal in the 
context of organization violations of the law); see also id. Rule 1.16(b) (permissive with­
drawal generally). 
13. See lVIODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(l) (1980). 
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viewed more as an adversary than a court? FinallyJ is this a case of 
pri'/i1eged communication? 
The discussion concludes by observing that the problem is 
probably an unreal one, for no such extreme case has actually 
arisen. There is an explicit assertion that, if this situation did occur, 
it would have become clear to everyone early on that disclosure was 
inevitable; and the real solution to a dilemma like this (which is a 
real dilemma in other cases) is an early, credible threat of with­
drawal by the attorney. If the Bar would be clearer with clients as 
to the conditions under which its members will withdraw from rep­
resentation, it would be relatively easy to keep clients in line. 
Again, the point of reflecting on this problem is not to say that 
any of its explicit assertions are wrong. If we were to look at this 
problem, not for the answers it gives to a hypothetical professional 
responsibility problem, but to observe the way that lawyers see the 
problem, what would we observe? 
First, ethical problems are treated as legal issues. The ques­
tions are whether a certain action constitutes fraud, whether the 
FAA constitutes a tribunal, whether the statement is a privileged 
communication, and whether withdrawal would prejudice the cli­
ent. There is no discussion of why that is so. It seems self-evident. 
But we are talking about an unusual source of law. The ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility is something between 
the Ten Commandments and a press release. The American Bar 
Association is a private organization, and its pronouncements have 
no legal force. Of course, in one form or another the Code is--or 
was-law in the sense that the Supreme Court of every state 
promulgated it. But if you ask why we have to follow it, the going 
gets a bit slippery. One answer is that one who violates the Code 
may get into trouble. Some discussions say that explicitly: would 
you be "in trouble" considering the language of DR "X" or in light 
of ABA Opinion "Y", if you did this? The accurate answer is that 
you very likely will not be in trouble no matter what you do. Very 
few lawyers are disciplined, and especially not in mind-boggling, 
agonizing matters like the Trireme problem. You really do not 
have to worry on that account.14 
14. Recent years have seen a partial erosion of attorney insulation from the risk of 
discipline in a case such as Trireme, although the "discipline" is more likely, in my 
observation, to take the form of litigation asserting the attorney's liability to a person 
injured by a breach of professional ethics than the form of a disciplinary proceeding. I 
do not think that this trend has yet progressed far enough to explain the phenomenon 
disc•Jssed in the text, which long antedated it in any event. 
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Perhaps, of course, the point refers to the moral basis of the 
Code. There was a time when many lawyers viewed the Code as 
something like the Ten Commandments15 but I doubt many lawyers 
believe that today. Richard Abel has observed that the change in 
names-from Canons of Ethics to Code of Responsibility to Rules 
of Conduct-expresses "a progressive dedine in normativity."16 
One of the by-products of the controversy over the drafting and 
adoption of the Model Rules is that both the Code and the Rules 
are now even more than before viewed not as a body of moral 
norms, but simply as positive law1 and as open to criticism, avoid­
ance, or evasion as any other act of a lawmaking body. 
Nevertheless, the Trireme problem assumes that ethical issues 
are answerable in legal terms. And this view, it should be noted, 
applies to both the high side and the low side: if "whistle-blowing" 
(or other action inconsistent with a client's wishes or interests) is 
required by the Code, a lawyer must blow the whistle, and if it is 
not required by the Code, he or she may not, because the duty of 
loyalty fills all the rest of the space. In Orwellian terms, everything 
is either forbidden or compulsory. In this environment, problems of 
ethics or responsibility-what action do I choose to take, or feel 
called upon to take?-come to be viewed as problems of advocacy: 
what actions can I justify as permiss�ble or, better yet, obligatory?17 
Second, as the process of legal analysis continues, it acquires 
accelerating complexity. A relatively simple problem- not simple 
in its solution, but simple factually-becomes a multi-layered law 
review article. There are six crucial words of the Code needing con­
struction; there are several Bar Association Opinions needing rec-
15. A lawyer once said that to me explicitly, with reference to the 1974 ABA 
amendment regarding group legal services (one of the controversial and short-lived 
"Houston" amendments). When I responded that it has never been reported that the 
Ten Commandments were amended by a vote of 140 to 117, he shrugged; he viewed the 
Code as per se morally authoritative. 
16. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 686 
n.257 (1981). 
17. One consequence, in the context of this problem, of the focus on legal answers 
to ethical questions seems especially bizarre. Great attention is paid to the questions of 
disclosure and withdrawal, but none to the fact that the attorney is asked to move from 
passively aiding or protecting the company by silence, to actively seeking to keep the 
planes flying by filing motions designed to fend off the FAA. The explanation for this 
priority, I believe, is nothing more than the fact that filing motions is thought to raise 
ethical problems only when they are substantively groundless. See MoDEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES­
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). I cannot imagine that anyone other than a lawyer 
would perceive this phenomenon as anything but grievously astigmatic. See infra text 
accompanying note 18. 
1168 UCLA LAW REV!El!V [Vol. 37:1157 
onciliation. By the time one is finished, a sense of bewilderment 
interacts with the fact that the problem is viewed as a legal rather 
than an ethical problem, so that a decision to do nothing seems 
comfortable. After all, what does one do after reading ten pages of 
dense legal analysis about a moral problem? One says, "Well, that's 
a hard question and who knows what is right," and goes on to 
something else, not having engaged with the broader dimensions of 
the problem and channeled toward a response that avoids the need 
to do so. 
Seeing the question as a legal issue, and multiplying the com­
plexity and subtlety of the legal issues, removes from thought the 
real question, and the omission from the discussion of any consider­
ation of the moral dimensions of the question nails down the re­
moval. Again, what the "real" question is may not be self-evident. 
To me, it is this: what do you do if you, an autonomous professional 
genuinely concerned about the danger but recognizing that you do 
not really know how substantial it is, are told by this powerful, suc­
cessful, fairly aggressive person whom you represent, not to worry 
about it? You are reluctant to drop the matter because you are 
afraid that the company president may not really be open to hearing 
the problem, and part of your job, as well as your responsibility to 
yourself, is to worry. On the other hand, he is intimidating you and 
might fire you or lose confidence in you. More than that, you re­
spect him: he knows more about this matter than you do, and if you 
have been representing him, you probably think that he is doing an 
admirable job under dreadful circumstances. When the president 
tells you not to worry about it, that he knows all about it, and has 
decided everything is all right, it is not just lust for a fee that keeps 
you quiet. Your tendency to remain silent is reinforced (if you have 
any sense) by some humility about whether he may be right. Trust 
me, he says, and says it with a smile and with a fist. And both of 
them are effective. 
That to me is the real problem, and an extremely agonizing 
problem it is, of being a lawyer: how do you keep your self-respect 
as a lawyer in that circumstance? The problem is transformed from 
a painful to a stimulating one by viewing it as a series of legal com­
plexities. By the time the panelists finish analyzing all the issues, 
everyone is ready to shake hands all around, say that this has been a 
very useful discussion-no one could possibly remember which 
Code provision he or she thinks has been the crucial one-and go 
off thinking: "\Veil, I'll just pick up the next matter in my 'in' box 
and go on with my work." The intellectual challenges of wrestling 
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with a hard problem in professional responsibility provide a cathar­
tic release from the grip of the problem as it would otherwise be 
experienced. 
Finally, the conclusion of the article-that this is an extreme 
case not likely to occur-legitimates the attitude that we really do 
not have to worry too much about this kind of problem. It does not 
get out of hand; only borderline, defensible issues come up, and it is 
in everyone's interest, clients and lawyers, to do the right thing. 
Thus, the analysis both illustrates the way, and reinforces the 
process by which, our selves become removed from the legal 
problems we work on as lawyers. Personal conflicts-whether over 
conflicts between loyalty to client interest and concern over public 
harms, or the conflict between one's self-image as an independent 
professional and the power imbalance vis-a-vis the company presi­
dent-are abstracted from the activity of lawyering. 
Indeed, the message is not only that this does happen, but that 
it needs to happen. Only in that way can we live with the tension. 
For I think it is clear that the unspoken messages of the Trireme 
discussion come through much more loudly to students than the 
question of what constitutes a "tribunal" within the meaning of DR 
7- 1 02(B). And the final assertion that is made is that a good lawyer 
thinks and acts as all the other unexpressed assertions prescribe: a 
good lawyer treats ethical problems as legal ones, attuned fully to 
their accelerating complexity; a good lawyer does not talk about or 
focus attention on the dilemma of how to deal with powerful clients 
and maintain a sense of independence and integrity; and a good law­
yer believes that the problem does not get out of hand, that it is 
manageable. 
3 .  An Administrative Law Problem 
A friend has begun his administrative law course with this 
problem: assume that a newspaper has written a major expose about 
the overuse of tranquilizing drugs in prisons. The article describes 
extensive use of such drugs in cases where no real judgment has 
been made that there is mental disturbance, including instances of 
routine or punitive administration by guards and other unlicensed 
personnel. After a public furor, a quick scheduling of legislative 
hearings, and a rush to posture before the media, the legislature 
passes a law to stop this outrage. The statute is one sentence long: 
"In order to protect the health of prisoners and the interests of soci­
ety, the Commissioner of Corrections shall promulgate and enforce 
rules to regulate the improper use of drugs in prisons. "  
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The problem posed to the class is  twofold. First, how should 
the Commissioner of Corrections go about deciding what to do? 
Second, what should the Commissioner decide? 
The first issue raises the question how an agency informs itself 
prior to making decisions : should the Commissioner sit in his or her 
office and think, read articles, seek the advice of a knowledgeable 
friend or consultant, rely on the knowledge and priorities of the 
staff, hold a hearing? In legal terms, the case study raises issues 
regarding legislative rule-making, the right to a hearing, and the 
form of a hearing. If there is to be a hearing, should the agency 
publish a notice in the newspaper, should it write letters inviting 
interested parties or groups to appear, should it let people appear in 
person, should there be witnesses, should it make a record, should it 
give participants the right of confrontation and cross-examination? 
The second issue goes to the substance of the decision: the 
problem assumes that the Commissioner does hold a hearing, and 
asks or permits several organizations, such as the guards' union, the 
ACLU, the drug companies, to make submissions. Students are to 
play different roles, preparing testimony to be offered at the hearing. 
The issues to some degree arise out of the parties' submissions: 
should there be a requirement that drugs be administered only with 
consent? Should there be a requirement that they be administered 
only with the approval of a physician, a psychiatrist, or a panel of 
physicians? Should their use be limited in time, or should the size 
of the population receiving drugs be limited? Should there be sub­
stantive safeguards, or other sorts of restrictions? 
This is a sophisticated problem, well calculated to teach much 
valuable administrative law matter, and nothing that follows denies 
that. However, the problem also teaches, implicitly, a lot about law 
and lawyering, and their interaction, that needs to be addressed ex­
plicitly. If we look at the story as a series of events and not as a 
series of legal problems to be debated, it contains, first, an excellent 
illustration of a contradiction basic to the legal process. The news­
paper and legislative furor illustrates the very real and significant 
commitment to basic human values-specifically, individual dig­
nity, autonomy, and privacy-that is part of law. Widespread pub­
lication of a story like this affronts a widely held value that has 
genuine force. The legislature feels that it must act. It cannot sim­
ply say, "To hell with them, they're a bunch of junkies and cons 
anyway. " And so it acts. 
At the same time, the legislature cannot do anything about the 
problem. By that, I mean that the legislature cannot do anything 
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about it ',vithout also affronting other values that it cares about. 
One is simply the reluctance to spend money; another is an authori­
tarian, punitive concept of penology, which is inconsistent with a 
desire to do much about the problem; and a third is an expertise­
oriented approach to professionalism in the medical area, and the 
use of medication, that the legislature has no interest in examining. 
The legislature delegates the problem to an administrator and 
declares it solved: we have taken care of this problem by assigning it 
to this excellent person, whose job it is to do something about it. 
The administrative process in this scenario plays the function of le­
gitimating the claim that the legislature has "done something." Ob­
viously, if all the legislature did was to pass a law saying that a 
prestigious local law school should study the problem and publish 
an article discussing it, people would find this action a bit irrespon­
sible. But the administrative process legitimates delegation by mak­
ing it credible to say that its outcome provides a solution. It does 
this in part by providing a hearing that is regarded as fair. The 
hearing therefore must be fair enough to make that claim credible. 
If the Commissioner simply said "this is what I think," and pub­
lished some regulations, there would be an outcry that he did not 
listen to knowledgeable or interested parties. The outcry would be 
fueled by objections to the result, but lent credence by the illegiti­
macy of the process. 
At the same time, we know that no matter what happens, no 
matter how the hearing goes, no matter what the rules say, no mat­
ter what procedures are followed, the prisoners will not get physi­
cians who will protect them from unwarranted use of medication. 
When the prisoners were out "in life" they did not have such doc­
tors, and they will certainly not have them now. We know that this 
rural prison of a thousand people is not going to have a staff of 
psychiatrists overseeing a drug problem. We know that in any large 
building you might name-probably not excluding the one in which 
these words are being read-the use of medication is woefully exces­
sive. Of course it is usually taken on a voluntary basis, but what we 
mean by "voluntary" is rather subtle; what we mean is that the level 
and kind of influences are regarded as acceptable. We label as "co­
ercion" that which is not acceptable. Some "voluntary" drug users 
are "influenced" by their doctors, some by their families, some by 
their employers, and some by their perception of the alternatives. 
Studying the problem in a classroom environment mirrors the 
political reality. Taking the problem seriously validates the com­
mitment of the law to individual dignity and autonomy; yet the is-
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sues raised-the kind of hearing, the range of arguments, issues of 
judicial review and substantial evidence-all assure that no matter 
what happens, not much is going to change. The well-trained legal 
mind is one that does not rebel against this fact. In contrast, a lay 
person (for example, a professional from another profession, or a 
first-year student still open to the charge of being a "mushhead") 
will often respond to a problem like this one by raising questions 
such as: why are so many people in prison; why are prisons several 
hundred miles away from the prisoners' homes; why are the drugs 
there in the first place; why are drugs so readily available to people 
generally? Our immediate reaction to each of these questions is to 
say: "Hold on, none of them is relevant. We are not talking about 
sentencing policy. You may think that there should not be prisons 
with a thousand people in them, or that there should be community 
treatment centers. We are not talking about that. You may think 
that people should not have access to drugs just because they want 
them, so you do not like prisoner consent as a safeguard. \Ve are 
not talking about that. You may think that urban blacks should not 
be imprisoned in a locality that insures that their guards will be 
mostly rural whites; you think that guards should be blacks from 
the prisoners' own community, and who do not have clubs and the 
like. We are not talking about that either." 
That is what we teach, and that is what we are supposed to 
teach: focus on the issue at hand, strip away what is not in question, 
not open to question, or not obtainable in this forum. That method 
has unquestioned value as a mind-training device. It also has the 
broader effect of making the problem unsolvable. I do not mean 
that it was solvable before� The problem is unsolvable because the 
only way it can be solved is by changing a whole series of "givens" 
regarding prisons, drugs, and the physician-patient relation in ways 
that our society is not willing to do. The "professional" approach 
to lawyering makes the input of the legal process and of lawyers 
accommodate itself to that unsolvability. So, if you represent the 
ACLU, you write a first-rate brief that begins by giving up (by fail­
ing even to ask for) six or eight important civil liberties goals be­
cause you know that you cannot get them. You do not ask a court, 
for example, to shut the prison down and open three smaller ones 
nearer the prisoners' homes. You do not attack the Commissioner 
as closed-minded or lacking in requisite independence because he or 
she is a former district attorney, police officer, or parole officer. The 
list of "unthinkable" objectives can go on. 
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In teaching this problem as an administrative law problem, we 
reinforce the message that the j ob of a lawyer is to achieve the best 
result available within the limits presented. To be sure, the lawyer's 
job is to look skeptically at what are asserted to be the limits, and to 
press against them to the extent it seems productive to do so, but 
then to accept what is given and work toward the best you can get 
within those limits. The limits themselves are not your problem, 
and should not be made your problem. If you cannot live with 
that-and sometimes you may not be able to-- do not appear in the 
case. Write an article for a magazine about prisons, become a war­
den, run for the legislature, but do not work as a lawyer. 
Embedded in that prescription is the premise that a half-loaf is 
better than none, that a quarter-loaf is better than none, that an 
eighth-loaf is better than none. Being a good lawyer is accepting 
reality, and getting what you can within it, instead of antagonizing 
everybody and getting nothing. This comes up very clearly in the 
work of lawyers who represent poor people, political dissidents, or 
others who do not trust the prevailing social order or share its 
premises. And by keeping the assertions regarding lawyers' func­
tion implied (or axiomatic), the traditional message fails to perceive 
the presence of an issue of client autonomy and professional domi­
nance. Should the lawyer, or the client, make decisions regarding 
goals and tactics? The lawyer who defines the questions of his or 
her client's values, with respect to objectives, as "getting something 
rather than nothing" is making a decision by seeing no decision to 
be made. We should not assume that a client participating in a legal 
proceeding wants to "win" the legal proceeding no matter how lim­
ited a victory is open to realistic hope, or no matter what "transac­
tion costs" may have to be paid (by the client, not the lawyer). That 
may not be true at all. 
B. The Perceived Messages of the Law School Curriculum 
I want now to draw on the three case studies, and on other 
observations, to illustrate briefly the messages about being a lawyer 
that the law school curriculum implicitly espouses. 
1 .  Legal Subjects Develop in Significant Isolation from One 
Another, and Have a Substantial Coherence as "Fields" 
To say that this proposition is generally asserted in our teach­
ing is not to ignore the marked increase in recent years in the so­
phistication of law teachers with respect to their recognition that 
legal subjects-property, torts, and contracts, for example-fold in 
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on one another unceasingly. But I am concerned now with the con­
struction and execution of courses rather than with the themes of 
contemporary scholarship. In introductory classes or casebook 
chapters, and in periodic moments of rediscovery during the semes­
ter, the seamlessness of the web is recognized. But that acknowl­
edgement is muted in the student's experience by the firmly stitched 
seams of the casebooks, and by crowded syllabi that are thought to 
leave space for only an occasional reference to a course whose 
boundary has just been crossed or drawn in question-a reference 
triggering the hope (known to be vain) that the "other" teacher will 
attend to the frontier surrounding the boundary. 
The compartmentalization of students' thinking is reinforced 
by the use of traditional categories to divide teaching responsibili­
ties. A division that looks arbitrary, unaccustomed, or controver­
sial will raise questions that a familiar division will leave unstirred 
or will turn aside. Indeed, given the focus on appellate opinions as 
the basis for studying law, we would gain much by simply teaching 
a single volume of the law reports for a semester. (What would the 
Association of American Law Schools Directory do with a course 
entitled "274 A.2d"?) Students then would be forced to learn for 
themselves the reasons for the familiar categories, in ways that 
would not reflexively tum aside attention to the limits of those 
reasons. 
The substantive effect of compartmentalization is striking. In 
the Trireme problem, for example, thinking of the issues as ones of 
"professional responsibility" (and therefore not, inter alia, "proce­
dure") facilitates an approach that sees ethical questions in an attor­
ney's silence, but not in an attorney's moving to quash a subpoena. 
Studying procedure as a field of substantive law (and not one which 
supplies a context for the study of professional responsibility) facili­
tates an approach to the ethics of filing motions that focusses nar­
rowly on questions like frivolousness, delay, and Rule 1 1  
sanctions. 18  The result is that in neither course would any notice be 
taken of the ethical significance of filing the motion to quash, by 
which the lawyer moves from a passive to an active role in enabling 
the company to continue carrying on an extremely hazardous 
activity. 
Even more far reaching is the way that the habit of compart­
mentalization channels one's thinking about fundamental questions 
of lawyering. Learning the skill of focusing one's attention by nar-
1 8 . See, e.g. ,  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 1  (requiring sanctions for frivolous motions). 
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rowing it  too often brings with it the ready acceptance of role-de­
fined morality and exaggerated forms of moral skepticism and 
relativism. 19  
2.  The Core of Law is Private Law, that Is, Governmental 
Facilitation of Private Ordering; Regulation is a Latter-Day 
Set of Exceptions 
Here, too, recent changes have wrought less change than one 
might assume. Certainly, common-law development is now often 
explicitly regulatory in its impulse, and the traditional "common­
law" subjects are pervaded by statutory, even constitutional, inputs, 
which are only in part codifications of the common law. Yet the 
fundamental points of departure, ideologically no less than histori­
cally, remain: in contracts, the necessity and sufficiency of assent; 
in torts, the requirements of fault and causation; in property, the 
corollaries of the power to exclude; in civil procedure, the judicial 
system as passive adj udicator of disputes brought into the process 
through private decision-making. If I may use my own words-not 
as authority, but to avoid unacknowledged repetition-what is ob­
servable with respect to labor law, traditionally thought of as an 
upper-year "regulatory" course, is a fortiori so in the first year: 
[T]he changes that have occurred are ideologically peripheral. 
The periphery may be extremely complex and significant, but it 
is nonetheless comprised of exceptions, each of which needs to be 
justified as a departure from the norm. Moreover, neither a par­
ticular regulatory program, nor its totality, is seen as embodying 
a fundamental rejection of freedom of contract as a primary so­
cial value. To the contrary, each regulatory program is explicitly 
required to be construed to respect the principle of freedom of 
contract as much as possible. 20 
We can see the power of this premise in each of the three case 
studies. The governing maxim is that people with power exercise it 
as they wish, free of the need to account to others, unless they have 
violated some applicable rule. A company refuses to recognize a 
union chosen to repesent its workers; a lawyer chooses to prefer his 
client's interests over those of "the public; " a warden manages a 
1 9. "Legal argument has a narrowing and focusing nature and when issues are put 
beyond the scope of what is legally relevant . . .  it does not seem fruitful to put class 
time into them. From accepting their irrelevance to the argument, we often move im­
perceptibly to thinking them irrelevant altogether. " E. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN & 
1-I. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDU­
CATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 2 ( 1 9 8 1 ). 
20. Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of A merican Labor Law, 32  
BUFFALO L. REV. 833 ,  845-46 ( 1 983). 
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prison through widespread use of medication. In each case, deter­
mining whether power and discretion have been "abused" means 
examining whether legal restraints on discretion have been observed 
and responding to the perception of abuse in ways that intrude as 
lightly as possible on pre-existing allocations of power and 
discretion. 
3 .  The Core Skill of Lawyering I s  Incisive Analytic Reasoning; 
It Is Largely this Ingredient that Determines the Quality of 
Legal Representation and Accounts for the Quality of 
Judicial and Administrative Decisions 
Law schools emphasize "legal reasoning" for good reasons. It 
is difficult and challenging; it is in many ways the prerequisite of 
deeper and broader thinking; premature or excessive skepticism 
about its relevance to decision-making can sap the motivation to 
master its challenges; students can study it in the large-class, 
casebook-based format that the economics of legal education ap­
pears to require. But even though a ballplayer cannot succeed with­
out learning to hit, if a school of baseball taught only hitting until 
neophytes succeeded at it, and left base running and fielding for 
"later life," it would produce all too many competent hitters who 
are not only disastrous in the field, but who are too often forced out 
or picked off. Put at its simplest, recognizing the necessity of intel­
lectual power to good lawyering or judging is a long way from con­
ceding its sufficiency. Yet by dwelling for the most part on analytic 
ngor, law schools tend to conflate the two in students' 
consciousness. 2 1  
Law study systematically exaggerates the importance o f  the 
merits, the existence of a cause of action or defense, and systemati­
cally pays insufficient attention to other inputs to the quality of rep­
resentation, such as the availability and quality of counsel and other 
litigation resources, and to the vagaries of marshalling and present­
ing a case, let alone to "nonlegal" factors affecting the perceptions 
2 1 .  The emphasis on the intelligence or analytic prowess of judges or judicial nomi­
nees is illustrative. How often is it deemed somewhat inappropriate to criticize the 
work product of a j udge or justice who can be defended as "really sharp"? That Daniel 
Manion may have been thought disqualified to be a judge simply by reason of assertedly 
sub-marginal analytic skills, see Senate Casts 50-49 for Manion; Controvei·siaf Choice for 
Appellate Court Wins Confirmation, Wash. Post, July 24, 1 986, at A 1 ,  does not establish 
that some others are qualified to be judges simply by reason of assertedly outstanding 
analytic skills or impressive law school academic records. 
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of j udges, j urors, and 'vvitnesses. 22 This pattern suggests to students 
that these factors do not merit serious thought by first-rate minds, 
vihether in considering questions of public policy or in practicing 
law. 
In addition to exaggerating the salience of reasoning and "the 
merits, "  legal education tends to focus on a narrow form of reason­
ing. Analytic reasoning responds to the felt impossibility of think­
ing about "everything" in a disciplined way. It is sufficiently 
challenging that students eagerly adopt the pattern of putting aside 
context. When the process is not sufficiently explicit, however, the 
"putting aside" becomes more than a heuristic device. Compare the 
observations of the noted comparativist , Rene David: 
English law was born of procedure, a fact which has implications 
not only for the technical form of the law but for legal philoso­
phy as well. English law excels in the consideration of concrete 
problems and in the discovery and application of practical for­
mulae. It shows a distrust for broad principles and overly ab­
stract generalizations. . . . English law is not an educating or 
moralizing law, but an esoteric, technicians' law . . . .  Whatever 
is unrelated to litigation . . . does not concern jurists. 23 
Moreover, as the Yeshiva Note illustrates, the emphasis is on 
the use of reasoning to evaluate, rather than to understand or ex­
plain. The result is a narrowly analytic approach to reasoning that 
can quickly become disembodied from context. The extent to 
which a particular consciousness, emphasizing analysis over con­
text, exists may be understood by considering a polar consciousness, 
given voice by the Vietnamese monk, Thich Nhat Hanh: 
Just as a piece of paper is the fruit, the combination of many 
elements that can be called non-paper elements, the individual is 
made of non-individual elements. If you are a poet, you will see 
clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of paper. With­
out a cloud there will be no water; without water, the trees can­
not grow; and without trees, you cannot make paper. So the 
cloud is in here. The existence of this page is dependent on the 
existence of a cloud. . . . [Because the forest cannot grow without 
sunshine] you can see sunshine in this sheet of paper. And if you 
22. Consider the observations of the incumbent Chief Justice of the United States: 
"[L]aw schools should concern themselves, perhaps more than they have in the past, 
with the structure of the practicing bar." Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 
IND. L.J. 1 5 1 ,  1 57 ( 1 987); see also Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the 
Politically and Socially Subordinated: A n ti-Generic Legal Education, 9 1  W. VA. L. REV. 
305, 322 ( 1 989) ("Law teachers almost obsessively study the results of formal legal 
disputes but pay almost no attention to how disputes emerge and transform and to how 
professional lawyering affects these emergences and transformations.") .  
23 . R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTUR E ,  SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 
73 (M. Kindred trans. 1 972) (footnote omitted). 
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look more deeply . . .  with the eyes o f  those who are awake, you 
see not only the doud and the sunshine in it, but that everything 
is here: the wheat that became the bread for the logger to eat, the 
logger's father--everything is in this sheet of paper. 24 
4. Litigation Is the Most Significant Means of Processing 
Disputes 
Casebook introductions abound with perspective about the ex­
traordinariness of litigation,25 reflecting (albeit palely) the recent ex­
plosion of scholarship about the pervasiveness of far less assertive 
responses to felt injustice. Yet the fact remains that the near-total 
attention of students is focused on litigated cases-indeed, on those 
disputes pursued to a decision on appeal. Beyond that, we do not 
study the system of litigation so much as we examine the merits of 
disputes, including disputes about procedure, successfully brought 
through the system. Else, we would emphasize far more than we do 
the availability of interim remedies (bail, preliminary inj unctions, 
stays pending appeal); the effects of the structure of the market for 
legal representation, of other costs of suit, of delay, and of calendar 
and settlement practices; the law of justiciability and of parties; and 
the efficacy of post-judgment remedies-in short, we would empha­
size the institution of adj udication. 
The Yeshiva Note manifests the emphasis on doctrinal correct­
ness; "Trireme" and the administrative law problem emphasize the 
strength of the tendency to collapse issues of judgment, responsibil­
ity, and values into questions of law. By emphasizing the correct­
ness or doctrinal effect of the answers that litigated cases give to 
questions of legal regulation, we overstate enormously the capacity 
of litigation to answer such questions in a manner responsive to the 
needs of the litigants, and encourage students to take for granted 
the desire and the capacity of "the parties"-who of course were 
simply "people" until a complaint was filed--to obtain an adjudica­
tory answer. 
5. The Lawyer's Task Is to Make Arguments or Shape 
Transactions on Behalf of the Instrumental Objectives, 
Usually the Financial or Autonomy Objectives, of His 
or Her Client 
Several years ago, a first-year criminal procedure teacher at a 
leading law school, after posing a hypothetical question seeking to 
24. T. NHAT HANH, BEING PEACE 45-46 ( 1 987). 
25. E.g., R. COVER, 0. FlSS & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1-2 ( 1 988). 
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probe the contours of a recent fourth amendment decision, asked, 
"If you v,;ere the Assistant District Attorney) what would you argue 
on these facts in. opposition to a motion to suppress?" The student 
answered, "If I were the A.D.A. in that case, I wouldn't oppose the 
motion to suppress. "  The teacher replied, "You don't belong in law 
school, "  and called on someone else. 
So crudely explicit an incident may weil be fairly rare, and may 
be put aside as an "abuse. "  Yet what was articulated there is im­
plicit in the everyday work of law school: the emphasis on decisions 
in litigated cases, which constantly portray counsel in settings 
where the decision has been made to pursue claims of legal right 
through judgment (and beyond); the trivialization of "professional 
responsibility" issues, not only by their conspicuous absence from 
genuine engagement in the early months of law study, but by the 
tendency, as in "Trireme, " to limit responsibility to the effect of 
fraud, perjury, or illegality; and the "moot court" syndrome, which 
identifies brief-writing and oral advocacy as the premier skill of 
lawyering, to the exclusion, for example, of the ability to discern 
accurately the actual (rather than the attributed) goals and priori­
ties of a client. 26 Richard Wasserstrom suggests that aspects of 
legal education like these imply a conception of "good lawyers" as 
persons . . .  who can and will bring skills and knowledge . . .  
regularly and fully to bear upon any matter of concern to any 
client willing and able to employ them in order to further the 
client's interest, provided only that they, as lawyers, do not do 
what the law prohibits lawyers from doing for clients. 27 
Again, it is a polar experience that can make us aware of the im­
plicit assumptions of most law school discussions of disputes. Con­
sider this arresting experience recounted by Kenney Hegland: 
In my first-year contracts class, I wished to review various 
doctrines we had recently studied. I put the following: 
In a long term installment contract, seller promises buyer to de­
liver widgets at the rate of 1 ,000 a month. The first two deliv­
eries are perfect. However, in the third month seller delivers 
only 990 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed that he rejects de­
liveries and refuses to pay for widgets already delivered. 
After stating the problem, I asked, "If you were seller, what 
would you say?" What I was looking for was a discussion of the 
26. Law students would, for example, learn a far more textured lesson about the 
work of a lawyer if they spent a portion of their first semester carefully studying Warren 
Lehman's insightful essay, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1 078 
( 1 979). 
27. Wasserstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 5 5 ,  
1 56 ( 1 984). 
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various common law theories which would force the buyer to pay 
for the widgets delivered and those which \Vould throw· buyer 
into breach for cancelling the remaining deliveries . . . . 
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a 
volunteer. . . . [An eight year old son of one of my students] 
raised his hand . . . .  
"OK, " I said, "What would you say if you were the seller?" 
"I'd say, 'I'm sorry . ' "28 
6.  Little that a Student Did or Knew Prior to Beginning Law 
Study Is Very Helpful or Relevant to the Task of Learning to 
Be a Good Lawyer 
That aspect of the "boot camp" psychology which views the 
entering class as needing to learn to put aside (at least for a time) 
the mush it has learned in college has survived the substantial de­
mise of the menacing style of professorial dialogue. Even though 
the past twenty-five years has seen an acceleration in "the decline of 
law as an autonomous discipline,"29 legal reasoning still tends to be 
taught, especially to first-year students, as a realm of thought rela­
tively insulated from others. Moreover, while the relevance of grad­
uate study in other fields is now acknowledged as a valuable source 
of understanding, teachers rarely bring other aspects of the prior 
work and life experience of law students (more and more of whom 
are well past their early twenties) into classroom consideration of 
legal questions in any truly hospitable way. 
The exclusion is not merely of a student's personal history, 
such as prior work or study; it carries over to treatment of the rele­
vance of a student's larger sense of self, of purpose in seeking to 
become a lawyer, of his or her impulse to seek understanding. In­
deed, the heavy emphasis on an instrumental valuing of knowledge 
and skills discourages the search-which many intellectually able 
law students would welcome-for a broader knowledge than is 
"needed" for the particular task at hand, and thereby impoverishes 
even the search for knowledge and skills, lending law study the 
seemingly nonintellectual quality that other academically oriented 
28. Hegland, Why Teach Trial A dvocacy?: An Essay on "Never Ask Why, "  in Es­
SAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO LAW TEACHING 68, 
69 (J. Himmelstein & H. Lesnick eds. 1 98 1 ). For a slightly different version of this 
incident, see K. HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 283-84 ( 1984). 
29. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an A utonomous Discipline: 1 962-87, 1 00 
HARV. L. REV. 7 6 1 ,  76 1 ( 1 987). 
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people often find in it. 30 The narrowness of the contextual discus­
sion in the Yeshiva Note, for example, probably has its source in the 
overly unalloyed valuing of conciseness, a sharp definition of "the 
issues," and a quickness to draw a circle of relevance to an issue. 
One effect of this "privileging" of education obtained only after 
enrollment in law school is to reinforce a parallel approach to the 
lawyer-client rel2Jion, which powerfully legitimates professional 
dominance. Gerald Lopez has observed how the tendency to incor­
porate "little of everday life" into the educational program makes it 
likely that "future lawyers will continue to believe that they do their 
best work only and always at a distance from and without a deep 
appreciation for those with whom they work."3 1  
C .  The Infirmity in the Implicit Curriculum 
This catalogue of implicit messages could of course be refined 
through amendment or addition32 and, as starkly stated here, is 
probably overdrawn in several respects. Most teachers probably 
devote significant energy to conveying a somewhat broader message 
with respect to one or more ingredients. 33 I believe that nonetheless 
the overall message of the curriculum is barely affected by such ef­
forts, and that generation after generation of law students has at­
tested-some happily, some with hostility or self- doubt-to the 
accuracy of my hypothesis .  34 
I believe, as I have said, that many law teachers would not 
avow the implicit messages that I have here sought to describe. I 
base that conclusion on conversations with a great many law teach­
ers, of widely varying outlooks on legal education, over the years. 
Perhaps the only "objective" evidence that I can marshall in sup­
port of my belief is the widespread disenchantment among the pro­
fessoriate with the world-view and work product of its former 
students. Again, I invite you to measure the truth of what I say 
against your own experience of your colleagues. 
30. "[T]he law school belongs in the modern university no more than a school of -· 
fencing or dancing." T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING I N  AMERICA 1 55 ( 1 957). 
3 1 .  Lopez, supra note 22, at 340 ;  see id. at 353-54. 
32 .  For a somewhat different array, see id. at 308-58. 
33 .  Recall that it is part of my thesis that many, perhaps most, law teachers' own 
beliefs are closer to such a "broader message". 
34. In a context that is not wholly off point, Clark Byse recently looked back on 
"Fifty Years of Legal Education," and concluded: "Notwithstanding all the changes 
that have occurred. i t  seems to me that most American law schools are not fundamen­
tally different from their 1 93 5  predecessors. "  Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education , 7 1  
IowA L .  REV. 1 063, 1086 ( 1 986). 
1 1 82 UCLA LArr REVIEPV [V o 1 .  3 7 :  1 1 5 7 
There is a large ingredient of truth in each implicit assertion 
that I have attributed to the law school experience. The distortion 
comes in the partial quality of that truth, and in the pyramiding of 
the assertions' mutually reinforcing effect. Taken as a whole, they 
systematically discourage students (and faculty as well) from in­
quiring into unspoken premises, whether about the legal system, the 
larger social order, or the role of lawyers; they inhibit the experi­
ence of choice, of human responsibility for the social constructs that 
we call the law and the legal profession; they are-among other, 
perhaps more serious vices-profoundly anti-intellectual. 
Some teachers would subscribe to the implicit messages that I 
have described. Like that of the criminal procedure teacher quoted 
earlier, such avowals tend to be explicit in a most laconic way, ar­
ticulated only when needed to be asserted, and then only as ipse 
dixit-as premises of lawyering, to be borne in mind in the admis­
sions process-without acceptance of an obligation to engage re­
spectfully with those who think otherwise. But a decent respect for 
the autonomy of others requires that the teacher make the avowal 
part of the explicit curriculum, and present it as a central and 
deeply controversial belief about justice and ethics-in short, as a 
political practice that one may insist that students engage with, but 
that one is not entitled to impose through pretended or real asser­
tions that there are no alternative approaches to understanding or 
practicing law. 
Ill. AN AITEMPTED ALTERNATIVE: THE CUNY PROGRAM 
For one who shares my belief that the prevalent situation is 
seriously infirm, the question is whether it is worth attempting to 
conceive, articulate, and put into practice approaches that present 
to law students a fuller, more open sense of the social and political 
premises out of which the evolution of the substantive law, and the 
shaping of norms of practice, occur-that will expand, rather than 
atrophy, students' awareness of the centrality of choice, individual 
f_pand societal, in law and lawyering. I spent six years carrying on 
such an attempt in connection with the founding of the City Uni­
versity of New York Law School at Queens College, and it may be 
useful to describe some aspects of the approach begun there to re­
spond to the limitations of the implicit messages in the traditional 
curriculum. 
In presenting this description, I am not recommending adop­
tion of the whole or any aspect of the CUNY curriculum. Even if it 
had worked wonderfully at horne-and of course the result was 
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something less than that-its exportability would b e  dubious, for 
many general and specific reasons. However, it is important for 
those la'Vv teachers who have enduring and significant dissatisfac­
tions with prevailing patterns to explore ways of going beyond 
merely being dissatisfied. My hope is that the process of engaging 
with one specific set of alternatives wiH trigger constructive 
thoughts about ways in which other specific alternatives may come 
more fully into view. 
A. Premises, Purposes, and Structure 
For me, the major attraction and opportunity of the founding 
of a law school at the City University of New York lay in its appar­
ent willingness to make a dual commitment: to make its educational 
premises and purposes explicit, and at the same time open to ques­
tion; and to design an educational program responsive to its prem­
ises and purposes. 35 1 begin therefore with a brief summary of our 
educational objectives as I came to understand them through the 
planning process. 36 
We sought to address four fundamental aspects of the learning 
environment: 
1 .  To teach subject matter in ways that integrate, rather than 
dichotomize, different fields, in order to facilitate, rather than im­
pede, the effort to articulate and draw in question the implicit prem­
ises and value choices underlying legal development; 
35. When I speak of "its" willingness, I do not mean to reify the participants in the 
experiment. The major actors who spoke for Queens College and the City University 
were interested, for several reasons, in establishing a law school that would be some­
thing other than "one more law school," and the CUNY tradition of access to those less 
able to avail themselves of educational opportunities by reason of class- and race-related 
barriers combined with the CUNY interest in preparing graduates for careers oriented 
to public service to create a hospitable atmosphere. Charles R. Halpern, the founding 
Dean, was a long-time leader in the effort to devise methods of clinical education that 
equipped students to do high-quality public interest practice, and he was eager to pur­
sue that effort in the context of a thoroughgoing reexamination and restructuring of law 
school curricular methods and content. I remain grateful to him for the discretion that 
I enjoyed as the person primarily responsible for the development of the educational 
program, and for the confidence in me that he manifested, often in the face of considera­
ble grounds for doubt. 
36. It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding a genuine commitment to 
being explicit, the process of articulating premises and purposes is a challenging one, 
which probably cannot be--and, in any event, in this case was not-accomplished all at 
once, or fully at all. The process is necessarily a dynamic, developmental one, and even 
a retrospective statement of premises and purposes should be seen as work in progress. 
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2 .  To study legal development in the context of lawyering de­
cision-making, in order to encourage students to see that law has 
significance only in reference to underlying human problems;  
L;r 3 .  To study lawyering in the context of moral and political 
theory, and as an aspect of interpersonal communications, in order 
to encourage students to see their task as the mastery of skills that 
are not disembodied from questions of identity and values in their 
work; 
4. To actualize students' capacity to be active, reflective 
learners, in order to create a teacher-student relation that is less 
role-defined and more e :npowering of students, so as to enhance, 
rather than impair, the capacity of students to adopt in their law 
practice a less role-defined, more empowering relation with their 
clients. 
Each of the foregoing sentences begins with a goal that is itself 
a premise or means with respect to a deeper purpose, expressed in 
the remainder of the sentence. But the "deeper purpose" too needs 
to be subjected to the same probing process. Why do we seek to 
Ly open the values or perceptions underlying implicit premises; to view 
law as an input to the human relations that shape its application to 
people who are or might be clients; to view mastery of lawyering 
skills as imbedded in questions of professional identity, values, and 
goals; and to facilitate the restructuring of the prevalent patterns of 
teacher-student and attorney-client interaction? 
The more general and more fundamental educational purpose 
that these goals all serve is to enable students to exercise responsibil­
ity in the practice of law. The core meaning of the idea of responsi­
bility is recognizing that the choices one makes as a lawyer (like 
those one makes elsewhere in life) affect people's lives. From this 
recognition flows the realization that our work as lawyers can be an 
affirmation, or a negation, of our values, of the goals that we want 
our lives to strengthen. At CUNY, we sought to create an educa­
tional program that would actualize, rather than undermine, stu­
dents' aspirations toward finding in a legal career a means of 
expressing their commitment to justice, fairness, and equality, and 
that would not encourage students to set aside any such values, nor 
channel them into replicating existing patterns of legal representa­
tion. We sought to do this by aiding students to develop their facil­
ity to reflect on what they read, on what they saw others do, and 
what they themselves did; to perceive and understand the choices 
and premises often implicit in the structure and work product of the 
legal system; and to exercise their critical judgment in assessmg 
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their response to the world around them. Our aim was to en­
courage students to reflect on their life choices, their evolving con­
cept of professionalism, and the content of the law itself, in ways 
that fostered their capacity to practice law in a societally useful 
manner. 37 
G In my view, the primary task of a law school is to help students explore the fuller meaning and implications of responsibility in law 
practice. The greater part of our teaching time, however, needs to 
be devoted to giving students some of what they need in order to be 
responsible. The law school curriculum should reflect the faculty's 
effort to give content to these tasks. 
Knowledge of legal doctrine is of course a crucial part of what 
one needs to be responsible, as is skill at the basic lawyering tasks 
valued in the traditional curriculum: the ability to analyze and syn­
thesize legal principles, a keen sense of relevance and procedure, 
and the ability to organize and present a coherent and persuasive 
line of reasoning in speech and writing. Traditional legal education 
tends to value this skill and knowledge in itself, and it becomes the 
goal rather than a means toward reaching the goal. As a result, the 
traditional curriculum often fails to recognize, or to act on the rec­
ognition, that a person needs far more than these traditionally-val­
ued skills in order to be a responsible lawyer. 
The "more" includes the wider range of skills associated with 
clinical teaching in the narrow sense, such as planning a litigation 
or other aspect of representation, interviewing and counseling cli­
ents and prospective clients, conducting a trial or hearing, and ne­
gotiating and drafting agreed-upon resolutions of actual or potential 
disputes. For this reason, the idea that all students should be re­
quired to do some "clinica1 work" is one whose normative merit 
needs to be fully acknowledged. 
However, these traditional clinical skills do not sufficiently ad­
dress the need. To practice responsibly, a lawyer must also have 
37. This "explanation," of course, only opens further questions to inquiry, ques­
tions both of clarification and of justification. I cannot pursue the question of purpose 
further here, however, without diverting myself entirely from looking at the ways in 
which the program sought to carry out its purposes. 
A critical distinction to be borne in mind is that between teaching students that 
they should be responsible in their practice and enabling them to be responsible should 
they choose to do so---by teaching them something of the meaning of the idea of respon­
sibility and something of what they need to know in order to be able to be responsible. I 
have elsewhere explored, albeit in a format that is still terse and fragmentary, my per­
ception of the question of responsibility and values. See Lesnick, The Integration of 
R e5ponsibility and Values: Legal Education in an A lternative Consciousness a/Lawyering 
and Law, 1 0  NOVA L.J. 6 3 3 ,  633-35 ( 1 986) .  
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acquired several more qualitative skills, primarily those of listening, 
exercising judgment, and engaging in moral reasoning. Few law 
schools today seem to consider these skills as central aspects of 
clinical education. 38 
Still, however broadened the concept of "skill" may be, the 
need goes beyond what may be embraced by the term. The addi­
tional qualities central to the education of a responsible lawyer are 
as simple to state as they are difficult to expand upon, even in a 
summary fashion: a developing knowledge of oneself and a develop­
ing knowledge of the premises of the legal and social order. The 
former entails a commitment to experiential learning, feedback, and 
reflection as primary learning modes; the latter entails a commit­
ment to a substantial integration of legal theory with doctrinal or 
" skills" study. 
These are obviously demanding goals, very likely unreachable 
in full. But only when they have all been brought within our range 
of vision as genuine parts of the educational agenda is it time to 
begin the difficult work of triage; else we mask priority decisions as 
simple imperatives of time pressures. 
The primary means by which we sought to pursue our obj ec­
tives at CUNY was to restructure the work of students and teachers 
in several mutually reinforcing ways. 
First, we attempted to alter students'-and teachers'- experi­
ence of the boundaries of a "subject ."  We taught contracts and 
property together, in a course called Law and a Market Economy. 
We separated (for the time being) a major portion of constitutional 
law from other areas normally included in that course, and studied 
it alongside related areas of nonconstitutional law, in a course that 
(to make the breadth of its concept of "law" explicit) bore the 
rather awkward title of Liberty, Equality, Due Process, in Histori­
cal and Philosophical Context. Finally, we introduced civil proce­
dure in a broadened context, suggested by the title, Adjudication 
and Alternatives to Adjudication. 
We sought to teach a legal "subject" not only as specific con­
tent to be learned, whether as black-letter rules or as the "policy" 
arguments for one result or another, but also as a process of human 
interaction, whose understanding requires the ability to see implicit 
premises and links with moral, social, and political theory. 
38 .  Cf Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 835 ,  861  ( 1 987) ("The 
truly distinguished lawyer, however, the one who is recognized by his or her peers in the 
profession as an exemplary practitioner and whose work is marked by subtlety and 
imagination, possesses more than mere doctrinal knowledge and argumentative skil l ."). 
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Second, we added a first-semester course explicitly focused on 
lawyering issues. The course, called The \York of a Lawyer, em­
braced material often found in professional responsibility and law­
yering process courses, as well as some material typically not taught 
in the classroom at all. By including this material in a format that 
was coordinate with others, we endeavored to attest to its centrality. 
By addressing questions of skill embedded in those of role, identity, 
and values, v;e attested to their interconnection and brought to the 
surface the consequences-and the premises- of attempting to 
learn "skills" alone. 39 We sought, in all of our work with students, 
to keep in the forefront of our attention questions regarding the so­
cial consequences of the choices made by lawyers and the law; con­
sequences to adversaries, third parties, and the legal-political order 
itself were not reflexively deemed less significant than consequences 
to clients. 
Third, believing that revisions in course content and design 
would not suffice to accomplish the stated purposes, we explicitly 
made all of the course work an input to the carrying out of simu­
lated lawyering work. In what came to be called "Houses," groups 
of approximately twenty students worked in association with a 
faculty member (a "House counselor") who acted as a senior law­
yer-one with the time and commitment to teach his or her juniors. 
More than half of a first-year student's scheduled "class" week was 
to be work done in the Houses on the simulations. 
We were explicit that, in using simulations as a teaching vehi­
cle we were not simply adding the teaching of skills to that of 
knowledge, but were seeking to integrate both in a context that em­
phasized choice, responsibility for choice, and an awareness of pur­
pose. Each task that students undertook in the simulations had a 
three-part structure-planning, doing, and reflection. We spent 
considerable effort seeking to overcome the tendency to over- em­
phasize the "doing" phase. 40 
39. The tendency to equate clinical education with "skills" training has been, in my 
judgment, one of clinical education's great failings-for which many clinicians share 
responsibility with other teachers, administrators, and practitioners. See the trenchant 
critique by David Barnhizer, The Intellectual Contributions of Clinical Faculty: Facili­
tating Fundamental Change in the American Law Schools Through Aggressive Formu­
lations of Models of Justice and Humanity 5 ( 1 989) (unpublished manuscript) ("Unless 
the intellectual dimensions of the law, justice, and law practice are carefully nurtured by 
clinical faculty, the clinical process can become anti-intellectual, rigidly self-contained, 
and suffocating. "). 
40. I have set forth in an Appendix an excerpt from a memorandum prepared by 
Professor Vanessa Merton (now of the Pace University School of Law) that was distrib-
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Fourth , w e  greatly altered the evaluation o f  student work. Ex­
cept in the most extreme cases of nonfeasance, course work as such 
was not graded, in order to attest to our beliefs that knowledge "as 
such" is an inchoate value and that an examination, while in a sense 
an application of knowledge, typically cannot justifiably be termed a 
simulated lawyering experience. \Ve based evaluation of student 
performance on the work done in the Houses, where knowledge and 
skill were to be integrated in an application to a lawyering task. 
Beyond that, evaluation endeavored to address a range of qual· 
ities more closely comparable to those that are constitutive of excel­
lent work in a lawyer.4 1  We revised the indicia of quality to 
emphasize the process of doing lawyers' work as well as the final 
product-and in particular to encourage students to use their 
House counselors as mentors-and we abjured entirely the averag­
ing of grades from one semester to another, in favor of an avowedly 
developmental approach. Our aim here was to encourage students 
to take risks, to learn how to seek help, to learn in short how to 
become lifetime self-teachers. Our expectation was that these rather 
marked changes in the bases of grading would convey credibly to 
students a broadened concept of quality lawyering and of 
learning. 42 
While it is essential, in my judgment, to articulate goals and 
methods at a rather high level of generality, the effort takes on clar­
ity and focus only in specific applications. I will therefore describe 
with some particularity the initial simulation, which provided the 
context for the opening month of a CUNY law student's course of 
uted to students in the opening days of the first semester. We designed it  to make 
explicit this structure, and its premises and purposes. 
4 1 .  We evaluated student work in six areas, of which Legal Reasoning was but one. 
The others were Theoretical Perspective, Clinical Judgment, Professional Responsibil­
ity, Communication (embracing oral as well as written communication, and including 
listening as well as speaking or writing), and Management of Effort. 
42. Our approach to admissions reinforced these curricular efforts. If we were to 
assert our belief that quality legal work is not wholly defined by rigorous analytical 
reasoning, and that the social consequences of our professional choices are matters for 
which we should accept responsibility, we could not simply replicate the traditional 
criteria of "merit" in law school admissions. We scaled down sharply the weight given 
to LSAT scores, and in general used the indicia of academic ability more as an absolute 
criterion of admissibility than as a basis for choosing among academically qualified peo­
ple. We sought to develop methods of strengthening our capacity, in making relative 
judgments, to look to some of the less tangible qualities that make an outstanding law­
yer: judgment, initiative, empathy, interpersonal competence, and the ability to work 
collaboratively as well as independently. We believed that these criteria, valid in their 
own right, would also help us obtain a student body that was diverse in its cultural, 
ethnic, racial, and "economic" composition. 
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study. In light of what 1 have asserted initially about the "imprint­
ing" power of a student's early experience, it seems appropriate to 
devote special attention to that very special moment. 
B.  Crystallization: The A1ussel Bay Simulation 
We designed an opening simulation that was factually simple, 
but that would capture as full a range of the foregoing purposes as 
possible; if only once, we meant to show our students "the world in 
a grain of sand . "  The simulation, which ran for approximately one 
month, concerned a small group of people who \Vork together as a 
theater group and who had recently rented a theater in "Mussel 
Bay," a suburban community.43 They are interested in buying a 
house in the community, have found one that is to their liking, and 
have reached agreement on contract terms with the seller. The bro­
ker learns that a local ordinance and a deed restriction may each 
prohibit ownership or occupancy by unrelated adults. Two of the 
group are a couple, not married; the buyers have said that they 
want to take title in all of their names. The seller is under some 
time pressure to find a willing buyer. A neighbor is threatening ad­
verse action. 
We asked each student to act as a junior lawyer in a small firm 
consulted by either the buyers or the seller, and to act as the client 
in the opposite setting. The simulation took the problem only 
through the early stages of representation : an initial interview of a 
prospective client, the decision to undertake the representation, 
counseling the client regarding options, and an initial choice of op­
tions by the client. 
We assigned students a large number of specific tasks in the 
simulation. In role, they conducted an initial interview of a pro­
spective client; prepared a memorandum to the firm on the case, 
with a description of the client's goals and priorities and a recom­
mendation whether to undertake the representation; prepared a 
memorandum to the firm on the legal issues presented, with an 
analysis of the options, followed by a letter to the client outlining 
options;44 conducted a counseling interview with the client; and (as 
43. The description that follows does not accord completely with any single year's 
version of what we asked students to do. Each year, we introduced some changes in the 
setting and tasks. 
44. The options that students most often perceived were: to seek another house or 
buyer; to go through with the sale and purchase despite the risk; to seek a waiver, 
variance, or exemption from the local body that enforces the ordinance; to seek an 
accommodation with the neighbor or with the relevant local officials; or to bring suit in 
1 1 90 UCLA LA'VV REVIEJV [Vol. 37 : 1 1 57 
client) made a decision among the options.45 Out of role, students 
wrote memoranda reflecting on each lawyer-client meeting; received 
feedback from their clients on each meeting and on the client letter, 
in one-on-one meetings and in group sessions in which the House 
counselors participated; and prepared feedback agendas in prepara­
tion for the feedback meetings. 
Students met with their House counselor and small groups of 
colleagues to plan each step in the process. In that connection, they 
generated information needs, including needs for knowledge of the 
law, which were responded to in course sessions, to some extent in 
supplementary sessions in House, and to some extent in student in­
dividual and group work. 
We designed the problem to draw on all of the fall semester 
courses, which followed a syllabus that enabled students to address 
relevant aspects of the simulation as the House work progressed: 
(a) From Law and a Market Economy : ownership as the 
power to exclude; covenants running with the land, as a link be­
tween contracts and property; the interplay between facilitative and 
regulatory approaches to private ordering with respect to land; 
(b) From Liberty, Equality, Due Process: eighteenth and 
twentieth century perceptions of property as an ingredient of, and 
as a threat to, personal liberty; private and public restrictions on 
land use as protecting, and as impairing, freedom of association; the 
Constitution as higher law; 
(c) From Adjudication and A lternatives to Adjudication : for­
mal and informal methods of processing disputes; the structure and 
value bases of adjudication and of negotiated and mediated 
processes; the phases of a lawsuit; the federal system of courts and 
law-making; 
(d) From The Work of a Lawyer : accurate listening, and ac­
curate identification of client priorities and objectives, as lawyering 
skills; introduction to interviewing and counseling skills; the deci­
sion whether to undertake a representation; lawyer and client roles 
in the counseling setting, including the place of the lawyer's priori­
ties and objectives; authority and autonomy within a firm, and 
state or federal court, seeking to establish the inapplicability or unenforceability of the 
restrictive covenant and ordinance. 
45. Once, we ended the simulation by having the students, in role as lawyers, meet 
briefly in groups defined by the choice among the options made by the student who 
played their client. This was done to bring home to them how dramatically a client's 
choice may affect the task facing a lawyer, and thereby to supply a powerful experiential 
context for discussion of issues of client autonomy and professional expertise. 
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within the nrofession; introduction to the structure, content, and 
status of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and 
1\!Iodel Rules of Professional Conduct. 
It is useful to look bac:k over the ways in which the lVIussel Bay 
simulation was intended to further concretely a number of the 
School's  educational objectives. To do so makes manifest the rich­
ness of the simulation method and the interrelation of educational 
objectives. 
1 . The problem presents "the law" as something that lawyers 
need to learn in order to carry on their work, rather than as some­
thing that students need to learn in order to be tested, ranked, and 
certified. 
2.  It presents the study of law through a number of subjects 
that, though divided from one another for some teaching purposes, 
students perceive as connected parts of a single whole. 
3 .  By beginning on the second day of law school and having 
the students participate actively from the next day, the problem 
places the students in an active stance-talking, meeting, and writ­
ing-at the very outset. By the end of the first month, students 
have done three pieces of writing in role, and four or five out of role, 
had two interviews as lawyers and two as clients, and made impor­
tant decisions in three different contexts .  
4. The problem allows the planning and reflection/feedback 
stages to be carried on through group as well as individual work, so 
that students learn to work collaboratively as well as individually, 
and learn that they can learn from one another as well as from the 
faculty. 
5 .  The problem illustrates how legal doctrine grows out of 
human responses to human problems, and tends to become a struc­
ture that loses its connection with that source. 
6. It intertwines private and public law issues and allows so­
called private areas, such as enforcement of contracts (including 
those seeking to create rights and duties in third parties) and the 
right of property owners to exclude, easily to be seen as embedded 
in state regulation. 
7. The problem is one in which, although the merits of any 
lawsuit are relevant, adjudicatory responses are clearly of limited 
responsiveness to the clients' needs-the seller needs a prompt, in­
expensive solution; the buyers need a prompt solution that will not 
alienate the community. 
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8 .  The problem introduces students immediately to  the law­
yering skills of interviewing and counseling; and thereby attests to 
their centrality as aspects of quality work as a lawyer. It does so, 
however, in a context that emphasizes the critical part that list2n­
ing, exercising judgment, and addressing questions of client auton­
omy and professionalism play in the mastery of those skills. This 
process is aided by placing the students in the role of client as well 
as lawyer. 
9. The problem raises the question of what it means to prac­
tice in a private, fee-generating setting with an orientation to the 
public interest, and how "political" concerns-the impact and legit­
imacy of restrictions on private living arrangements-can and 
should interact with counseling and representational choices. 
10. The problem introduces students to the skill of "legal 
writing" in a context in which : 
a) students see writing in a legal setting not wholly sep­
arate from writing generally; 
b) students see writing as not reflexively more impor­
tant than other interpersonal skills; 
c) legal writing is not over-identified with advocacy; 
d) the traditional writing skills of clarity and coherence 
are valued, but in a setting that asks the writer to keep the intended 
reader, and other aspects of the context, clearly in mind, and that 
makes it plain that reader and context are situation-specific. 
1 1 . The problem has no clearly satisfactory response, and in­
troduces students to the skill of exercising clinical judgment.46 
IV. CONCLUSION/BEGINNINGS 
I imagine that it is clearer to most readers than it was to me 
eight years ago that, although one may wisely aspire to envision 
infinity in a grain of sand, it is in the nature of infinity that it  cannot 
be captured on a canvas and sketched out to be apprehended and 
absorbed. The very holism of the CUNY design was its greatest 
flaw: even if a faculty could be found that was willing to adopt so 
46. Of course, far more is required than a suitable problem if an educational pro­
gram is to create an atmosphere hospitable to learning to exercise judgment. A good 
educational program must emphasize openness to reflection and feedback, and learning 
from experience, as central aspects of that skill. In order to facilitate the strengthening 
of that quality, it must emphasize learner-directed feedback, the subordination of evalu­
ation to feedback, and a developmental approach to mastery and evaluation. These 
elements were central aspects of the CUNY concept, although they are only suggested 
in the descriptions above. 
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integrated and comprehensi ve a design, with the degree of rejection 
of division of labor that it entailed, the design would inevitably 
prove too partial and fragmentary . _.!\ grain of sand is not capable of 
providing neophyte lawyers with a sufficiently layered experience, 
and a three-year's succession of Mussel Bays was simply beyond us, 
faculty and students alike. 
Perhaps I am simply making a virtue out of necessity, but I 
find a fair amount of cheer in this conclusion. For the real question 
is not what "legal education" will do in response to the critique I 
have offered in this essay. The answer to that is clear: legal educa­
tion will go on as it has, changing ever-so-slowly, sometimes but not 
always for the better, while rejecting, deflecting, and absorbing criti­
cism. The real question is what those law teachers who find signifi­
cant merit in a particular critique can and will do in response to 
shape their own teaching. 
In that context, it seems to me that the pursuit, in a more tradi­
tional setting, of but one or a few of the goals or methods that went 
to make up the overall CUNY concept may be a more useful under­
taking than I was willing to concede eight years ago. Each of us as 
an individual contributes, no matter what our views and actions, no 
more than a grain (or two) of sand to the evolution of the law and 
its practice; the clarity with which we each undertake that work can 
be greatly aided by grounding it, if not in infinity, in a set of prem­
ises and purposes that is the product of our own reflection. 
A critical failing of legal education is that it is structured to 
discourage rather than encourage such searching. The emphasis on 
scholarship as compared to teaching, and on the study and teaching 
of law as compared to that of lawyering, is an aspect of this struc­
ture, for it tends to produce a faculty whose primary interest is in 
bringing to bear its considerable intellectual resources on thinking 
about legal regulation, and much less on grappling with the 
processes of becoming and being a lawyer. Another structural fac­
tor is the way that law school curricula tend to be built as amalgams 
of indiv1dual preferences, rather than through the assumption of re­
sponsibility for the shape of the whole by any person or institution, 
whether dean, committee, or faculty.47 
47. On both of these aspects, the following casual justificatory description of law 
faculties by a President of the Association of American Law Schools is revealing: 
The chief loyalty of the faculty may be to their various disciplines rather 
than to the dean or the school-and, if the faculty is to have the scope to 
develop its own intellectual interests in productive ways that redound to 
the luster of the institution, such a priority cannot be condemned. 
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But discouragement is not prohibition. It is open to us as indi­
vidual teachers to be aware of and resist the tendency generated by 
prevailing structures, and such resistance does not require changing 
the structures themselves. It is no more necessary than it is possible 
for an individual teacher, or a group of individuals, to undo the 
major structures that shape legal education. What may be possible 
is for those who see the importance of doing so to restructure their 
own teaching in ways that will help them to make students aware of 
the implicit premises of the legal and social order, including the 
educational venture in which they are participating, and to explore 
the functions and limits of those premises, and their implications for 
students' work as lawyers. Responsible lawyering at bottom calls 
upon one to struggle to be aware of what choices one does have and 
of what lies beyond choice. 48 We as teachers model such responsi­
bility when we carry on that effort with regard to the evolution of 
our own teaching. 
It matters less whether you find the particular vision that 
animated the CUNY experiment a source of insight than whether 
you seek to discern a set of premises and purposes that gives focus 
and direction to the evolution of your own teaching. Alone if neces­
sary, in collaboration with one or more colleagues if possible,49 
there is much each of us can accomplish to make our pedagogy 
more fully expressive of our perception of the world of law and 
lawyering. 
Kay, President's Message Nurturing Deans, A. AM. L. SCHS. NEWSL., Sept. 1 989, at 4. 
48. Warren Lehman has written insightfully of this concept: 
There is the problem. I do not think I like what this client wants to do, 
but I would feel very uncomfortable raising the issue. What, then, do I as 
a lawyer do? Here is the difficult answer: I admit to myself that I cannot 
talk to a particular client who is off-putting or overwhelming or cock­
sure, and that I would probably be a better person and lawyer if I could. 
This seems costly because it requires first that I take the trouble to dis­
cover in each case what I ought to do, and second that I recognize that, 
like every other human being, I cannot do everything. Neither the intro­
spection nor the confession is comfortable. It is no wonder we are 
tempted to avoid them. 
Lehman, supra note 26, at 1082-83 .  
49. A number of  schools, no more hospitable than most to  significant institutional 
modifications in their educational program, appear to be more hospitable to the idea of 
authorizing a faculty group to develop experimental enclaves, in some cases even for the 
first year curriculum. 
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APPENDIX 
THE �WORK OF A CUNY LAw STUDENT: 
SIMULATION AND THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING PROCESS50 
By Vanessa Mert0n 
[T]he work you do as part of a simulation is selectively, but not 
exactly, the same as what you would do as a lawyer confronted with 
a comparable problem. By drastically shortening the time frame of 
the actual process, the simulation allows you to to experience the 
consequences of your choices relatively quickly. In a simulation, 
you are asked to assume certain roles, and to engage in a variety of 
tasks, some in-role and some out-of-role (except for the ubiquitous 
role of "law student"). The generic set of tasks you are asked to 
engage m are: 
1 )  planning-identifying your purpose, your options, and 
making some deliberate choices; 
2) doing-carrying out the plan you develop, making the 
adjustments that seem required in light of your underlying 
purpose; 
3) reflecting- seeking to understand what happened, why 
it happened, and what and how you are learning about lawyering 
and yourself as a lawyer. 
Then the process starts over, with trying the same or similar 
task again, keeping in mind what you learned from what you did 
the first time. That is the essence of experiential learning, which we 
will ask you to do again and again and what lawyers who are willing 
to learn from their experience do throughout their careers. 
This sequence is the unifying pattern of the many stages of this 
and future simulations.  Each stage is important, but we want to 
place special emphasis on the planning and reflecting phases of the 
work we engage in. We do not expect you to, and hope that you 
will not try to, achieve perfection in your performance of lawyering 
tasks the first time out-or the second, or the fifteenth. Through 
the simulation, we do hope that you will be able to develop the self­
reflective approach to work that will enable you to continue to learn 
from the chaotic, largely unstructured, uncontrolled experience of 
being a lawyer. 
50. This memorandum was prepared by Professor Merton for distribution to 
entering CUNY law students and is on file at the UCLA Law Review office. See supra 
note 40 and accompanying text. 
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We believe that the simulation method offers certain advan­
tages over the two models of legal education that preceded it . One 
model, the apprenticeship model that prevailed until the last quar­
ter of the last century, involved the supervision of a working lawyer. 
The other model, sometimes called the Langdellian or case method 
. . .  has come to mean reading lots of appellate opinions and in large 
lecture-type classes discussing the legal principles they illustrate. 
The focus under the first system was very strongly on doing, learn­
ing in almost a rote method by following very carefully the rules or 
techniques that a supervising lawyer used in his-and then it was 
his-work, with little attention to the apprentice's developing a 
sense of generalizable principles or legal theory . The emphasis in 
the second model, to some extent in reaction to the first, was on 
thinking, with very little attention to learning how to apply in prac­
tice the theory and concepts that were discussed in the class, and no 
attention at all to the possible disparities between, for example, the 
facts that the judges writing the appellate opinions chose to include 
and those that may have actually existed. 
Our curriculum incorporates substantial elements of both these 
models, and seeks to integrate their strengths and minimize their 
shortcomings . . . .  
In that connection, lawyers need to learn to take calculated 
risks. A theme we will return to again and again is the impossibility 
of achieving perfection in professional work. No matter how care­
fully we plan, however talented and knowledgeable we are, we will 
always make mistakes. What simulation offers is the chance to 
make those mistakes in a protected environment in which the conse­
quences of the mistake is not that a client is injured or a cause is 
lost, but rather that you learn something about the law and law­
yering. Since learning is the goal, the "mistake" or "failure" is 
translated into success. This is not to suggest that you set out to 
make mistakes; just that the inevitable mistakes have a different 
meaning in the simulation context. 
Ours is a self-reflective approach to the lawyer's role. We do 
not want to teach in a way that students simply accept the tradi­
tional role axiomatically. We want students to have greater choice 
about how to integrate who they are as persons with what kind of 
lawyers they want to be. That is no easy task. Learning to fashion 
a lawyer's role that expresses who you are and is responsive to the 
needs of others requires continual reflection on the choices we tend 
to make reflexively and on the other options available. It requires 
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attention not only to what we are doing but to who we are becom­
ing. That task, a central part of the mission of this law school, can­
not be approached abstractly . It requires doing and reflecting and 
learning from doing. The simulation mode is ideal for that end. 
